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This paper examines the role of institutional variables in determining the large
disparities observed in self-employment rates across OECD countries. Our findings suggest
that a large public sector reduces the scope for independent work, while high levels of
product market regulation are positively associated with the self-employment rate. In
countries with high levels of perceived corruption, a high tax and social contribution wedge
fosters self-employment, probably because independent work makes it easier to evade tax
and social contribution. Cross-country, time-series data show that taxation has an opposite
impact in the other countries.
The case of Italy, which stands out among developed countries for its large self-
employment rate, is analysed in some detail in the concluding section, providing examples of
the importance of the identified institutional variables in fostering self-employment.
JEL classification: J23, J24.
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￿
Self-employment shows substantial cross-country variability even when the analysis is
restricted to OECD economies. Yet, self-employment is typically neglected in labour market
comparisons, and characteristics of labour markets such as wage-setting rules, firing
restrictions, replacement ratios, union density etc., that are usually taken into account in
international comparisons, refer to employees only. However, if taxation, social insurance
eligibility, incomes, working time and working conditions differ between the self-employed
and employees, labour markets are likely to be affected in a substantial way by the spread of
self-employment.
In some countries - Italy being an outstanding example - self-employment accounts for
a substantial share of the labour force. In others, like Norway and other Nordic countries, it
is almost negligible. Is there any reason for such large differences? Is it a matter of workers’
“taste” or rather of options available to people when choosing a job?
In this paper we investigate these questions by studying the relation between the self-
employment rate and the institutional characteristics of OECD countries. Institutions evolve
quite slowly, are more likely to be country specific, and shape the structure of incentives
affecting employment choices. In principle, tax levels, social security contributions, labour
and business regulations, are in principle important factors in determining the opportunity
cost of being self-employed, or in determining, as employers, the opportunity cost of hiring
people instead of buying services from independent workers. Other variables, even if
potentially important, like technological factors and industry composition, tend to converge
across industrialised economies and are less likely to account for the persistent nature of
observed differences in self-employment rates, and their time patterns.
In the first part of the paper, we analyze time trends of self-employment. There is weak
evidence of convergence across countries, and differences in the industry composition of
employment seem to play a minor role. In this section we also show the negative association
between self-employment, levels of development and capital intensity.
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In the second part, we move on to describe OECD countries according to five
institutional variables: public sector size, tax and social contribution wedge, regulation of the
product market, employment protection legislation, and an indicator that tries to grasp the
level of the culture of legality in the countries we consider, namely the Corruption
Perception Index. In this section we discuss their potential role as determinants of self-
employment rates and we present the data we use.
The public sector is thought to shrink the scope for private economic activities and so
to reduce the spread of independent work. Taxation, on the contrary, can encourage self-
employment insofar it allows workers or firms to avoid tax and/or social contribution
payments, which is more likely to be the case the greater the toleration of irregular activities.
In those countries where rules are more likely to be enforced, high taxation could even
discourage entrepreneurial activities. As to product market regulation, by affecting market
allocative mechanisms it can act in both directions, either supporting or discouraging self-
employment and small business. Employment protection, on the contrary, is expected
unambiguously to foster self-employment in that resorting to the services of independent
workers is a feasible way of bypassing employment protection legislation.
Plotting countries according to the first two principal components extracted from this
set of variables, we show that countries seem to cluster in groups that differ substantially as
to their self-employment rates. Greece, Turkey and Italy, with high levels of taxation and of
labour and product market regulation and a high Corruption Perception Index, together with
the countries with a small public sector, a low wedge and a high Corruption Perception Index
(Korea, Mexico and Japan), show higher than average self-employment rates. On the
contrary, north European countries (Norway, Finland and Denmark), with large public
sectors, high taxation and low Corruption Indexes, on average have quite low self-
employment rates.
In the third section, we try to delve into the relationship between this set of
institutional variables and self-employment, performing a set of regressions on a country-
sector panel. As a preliminary analysis, on the lines of the description given in the of the
previous section, we show a significant association between the first two principal
components extracted from the institutional variables and the self-employment rate. The
association remains significant even after controlling for capital per worker, introduced into9
the regression to control for technological factors, as suggested by the empirical and
theoretical literature. Regressions on single institutional variables show that:
•  public sector size negatively affects the self-employment rate;
•  the levels of product market regulation and employment protection are positively
related to self-employment rates. However, once product market regulation is
introduced in the regressions, employment protection is not significant.
•  with regard to taxation, we show that for those countries where the level of legality
is low, the tax and social contribution wedge is positively related to the self-
employment rate.
In the fourth section, as far as public sector size and taxation are concerned, we check
for the robustness of the results obtained in cross-section regressions regarding their
sensitivity to omitted country effects by using cross-section time-series data. The results
obtained in this section are largely consistent with those obtained in the previous analysis,
and show that the tax and social contribution wedge has a negative impact on self-
employment in countries with a higher level of legality and a positive one in those with a
lower than average level of legality, as measured by the Corruption Perception Index.
In the concluding section, after a brief summary of the main results and our
interpretation, we outline with some examples how the institutional factors we have taken
into consideration can, in practice, help to explain the anomalous case of Italy, which stands
out among the most industrialised countries for its disproportionate self-employment rate.
￿￿￿&URVV￿FRXQWU\￿GLIIHUHQFHV￿DQG￿ORQJ￿UXQ￿WUHQGV￿LQ￿VHOI￿HPSOR\PHQW￿UDWHV
According to a broad definition including all workers not classified as employees, in
most industrialised countries the share of self-employment accounts for at most 10 per cent
of people working in the non-farm sector. But there are significant exceptions.
The aggregate we consider includes entrepreneurs (those who run a firm or are helped
in their activity by one or more employees), people self-employed on their own account, and
unpaid family workers. Some authors do not include the last group in their definition of self-
employment because they are mostly interested in workers whose business choices are10
autonomous. From our point of view, however, it is important to distinguish employees
protected by employment protection rules from the rest of workers, who do not benefit from
them and have a different fiscal and social contribution position.
According to this broad definition, in the three-year period 1998-2000, the average
self-employment rate in the non-farm sectors ranged from 5.1 to 31.5 per cent in the OECD
countries excluding transition economies, with, at one extreme some north European
economies and, at the other, the Mediterranean countries and some new OECD members
(Table 1). Including agriculture, the self employment rate ranged from 7.5 to 53.8 per cent.
Part of the difference could be explained by statistical discrepancies across countries.
The low rate in the United States, for instance, is partly due to the exclusion of “incorporated
business” from the self-employment pool. According to Mancer and Picot (1999), if this
category of workers were classified self-employed, as in most other countries, the self
employment rate in the US would rise from about 7 per cent to 9.6 per cent, in line with
other industrialised economies.
However, considering the magnitude of the observed differences, and taking into
account that Eurostat data guarantee substantial definition consistency across the EU
countries, statistical discrepancies can hardly justify such a large variability.
In principle, even excluding agriculture, which traditionally has a high self-
employment rate, the industry composition of employment at country level could be an
important explanatory factor. The self-employment rate shows a similar pattern across
countries: it is higher than average in some industries like trade, restaurants and hotels, and
business services, much lower in others like manufacturing and telecommunications. Hence,
economies specialised in the former should show higher self-employment rates than those
specialised in the latter. In fact, differences in industry composition are not big enough to
account for self-employment variability. Comparing self-employment rates at the sector
level across the European economies, it is apparent that countries with high self-employment
rates gave higher than average rates in almost every sector (Table 2); moreover, computing
theoretical self-employment rates by assuming the same industry composition for each
European country (the European average), self-employment rates do not differ substantially
from those actually observed (Table 3). In Italy, regardless the already high level, the self-11
employment rate would be higher still if its industry composition were the same as the
European Union average.
Self-employment rates in the non-farm sectors do not show a clear convergence
pattern. In the period 1970-2000 (Figure 1) there is only a weak negative relation between
the increase in the self-employment rate and its level at the beginning of the period, and it is
mainly due to Japan. Thus, differences among OECD countries seem to be persistent, and it
is not possible to identify a common trend: during the 1970s, some economies experienced
an upturn in the self-employment rate after a steady declining trend, others showed an
increase only during the 1990s, and others again exhibited a constant decline or a substantial
stability (Table 4).
These different patterns suggest that no common factor, like technological trends or
industry composition shifts across countries, was at work. Acs, Audrecht and Evans (1994),
in a panel analysis for the OECD countries, find that the self-employment rate is negatively
related to GDP and positively related to the share of valued added of the service sector.
According to their results, the upturn in self-employment in the 1970s in some countries and
the recent increase in others are to be considered a temporary effect of structural change in
the industry composition of employment that should be offset in the long run by the growth
of GDP. The negative relationship between the level of development and the self-
employment rate in the non-farm sector is quite evident in a cross-section analysis. The
simple regression between self-employment and per capita GDP in purchasing power parity
terms explains more than 60 per cent of cross-country variability, even if some countries,
notably Italy, Korea and Greece, present substantially higher than expected rates. This
correlation has been justified on theoretical grounds by the model developed by Lucas
(1978). According to this model, as capital per worker grows the ratio between rents and
wages progressively decreases, so that marginal entrepreneurs who operate small, less
efficient businesses tend to become employees and the average firm size increases unless
this trend is counter-balanced by technological change. In his article, Lucas provides some
evidence for the US that firm size and GDP, as a proxy for capital endowment, were indeed
negatively related once a trend was included in the regression (with a negative sign on the
parameter estimate). Figure 3 shows the relation between the self-employment rate in the12
non-farm sectors and capital per-worker as measured in the Summers Eston data set. The
negative relation appears quite clear and consistent with the theoretical model.
The simple cross-country regression, however, probably does overstate the role of
differences in capital per worker because of omitted variables, and cannot account for some
of the differences observed, especially across countries with high levels of both per capita
GDP and capital endowment. Moreover, given the persistence of self-employment
differences across countries, other explanatory factors are to be found in a set of variables
that show little variability over time, or at least slow convergence across different
economies. Institutional characteristics seem to be natural candidates as they are relatively
stable over time, and in spite of economic convergence, countries differ significantly in the
way in which they regulate business and labour markets.
￿￿￿,QVWLWXWLRQV￿DQG￿ODERXU￿FKRLFH
Institutions shape the incentive structure that a worker faces when choosing
employment. We have singled out five institutional characteristics: labour market and
product market regulation, taxation, size of the public sector and a measure of the general
attitude to rules.
•  Taxation is the institutional variable that has received most attention from
economists as a potential determinant of the self-employment rate. Given that self-
employees are supposed to have more opportunity to hide income from the tax
authorities, these studies generally assume that the higher the tax rate on personal
income, the larger is the self-employment rate. It is also possible to argue that the
higher the tax and social contribution wedge on salaries, the greater is the incentive
for firms to replace employees with independent contractors, possibly disguised
employees, to reduce the cost of labour. This is easier in the service sector where
the distinction between salaried and self-employed jobs is fairly blurred.
A few empirical studies find some evidence in favour of this hypothesis.
Blau (1987) for the US, and Schuetze (1999) for Canada and the US find a positive
relation between tax rate and self-employment rate. Robson and Wren (1999) for a
panel of OECD countries find a positive relation with the average tax rate but a13
negative relation with the marginal one. Others researchers have challenged the
positive relation between the self-employment rate and tax rates on the grounds
that taxation is to be considered a constraint on entrepreneurial activities.
Davis and Henrekson (1999), for instance, claim that the smaller share of
small-business and self-employment in Sweden compared with the USA can be
partially explained by the higher personal income tax rate. They argue that those
activities where small firms are more represented, like personal services, were
implicitly penalised by the high level of taxation and by the limited possibility to
use the instruments designed to reduce the tax burden on business, such as tax-
deductible interest payments and other mechanisms like the accelerated
depreciation of machinery, which favoured capital intensive sectors.
The evidence of the importance of taxation may be only apparently
conflicting in that we should also take into account enforcement. If high tax rates
are enforced by an efficient administration regardless of employment status,
taxation could be neutral or even negatively related to self-employment if high tax
rates discourage entrepreneurial activities
2. On the contrary, if the capacity to
enforce tax rules is weak, or substantially lower for the self-employed, self-
employment will probably be encouraged by high levels of taxation and social
contributions. This ambiguity can explain why there is no clear-cut evidence on the
effects of taxation on the self-employment rate. In the empirical analysis we will
try to overcome this difficulty by interacting our measure of the tax and social
contribution wedge with a proxy for law enforcement in different countries.
•  Davis and Henrekson also point out that in Sweden public sector expansion in
activities like schooling and health-care has substituted public employment for
private operated business. Insofar its expansion crowds out private entrepreneurial
activities, public sector size is a potential explanatory variable for the self-
employment rate.
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•  Market regulation. Some studies have established a theoretical and empirical link
between employment protection legislation and the self-employment rate (Grubb
and Wells (1993), OECD (1999)). In economies with high levels of employment
protection firms would prefer to rely on sub-contractors rather than employees so
as to avoid hiring and firing restrictions. According to this point of view, the higher
the employment protection guaranteed by labour market rules, the higher would be
the self-employment rate.
Less clear, apparently, is the theoretical link between the self-employment
rate and product market regulation. It could be argued that a high administrative
burden is detrimental to business activities and in particular to small business. On
the other hand, business regulation can also be used by public authorities to protect
small-sized firms from large-sized competitors and can discourage the growth of
firms operating in some specific fields. In Italy, for instance, the trade sector has a
disproportionately large share of family-held shops, probably because market
regulation has discouraged the spread of chain store until recent reforms.
Moreover, in Italy, regulation of the liberal professions does not allow
advertisement or the constitution of stock companies; these restrictions can be seen
as major obstacles to the development of large-sized firms and thereby as one of
the reasons for the fragmentation of these activities.
In order to implement our empirical analysis we have collected data that should proxy
the above institutional characteristics in 23 or 25 countries, depending on the variables at
stake.
We consider industrialised countries belonging to the OECD. Given the focus on
institutional characteristics, we do not take into account former Communist countries
because their transition towards a market economy is not complete and their economies are
still affected by recent history.
For the regulatory environment we use the indicators of labour and product market
regulation  produced by the OECD, as recently published by Nicoletti Scarpetta Boylaud
(1999). The labour market indicators take into account regulations on regular and temporary
contracts. This is based on the OECD review of national laws affecting hiring and firing; the15
assessment of the OECD has been checked by member countries and incorporates their
suggestions
3. The product market indicators aim to measure public intervention on allocative
mechanisms without assessing its quality; they simply try to evaluate how friendly national
regulations are to market mechanisms in three areas: state control over business enterprises,
barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to international trade and investments. The basic
information was provided by member countries through a questionnaire supplemented by
other sources, and was aggregated in synthetic indicators by factor analysis; in our analysis
we use the broadest of these, which is expected to grasp the attitude of national regulations
towards market mechanisms.
To evaluate the role of taxation we use OECD data on tax and social contribution rates
net of public transfers, published in The Tax\Benefit Position of Employees. Tax and
contribution rates are computed for several different positions in the income scale and for
different family conditions; in our analysis we take the average over the wedge for a couple
with mean income and only one person employed and the average for a single person with
mean income.
As a proxy for countries’ attitude towards rules and their enforcement we use the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International, an international
leader in anti-corruption research. This index is based on a number of different surveys
measuring the perception of the degree of corruption by business people, risk analysts and
the general public. Comparing this index averaged over the period 1997-99 with historical
data, the ranking of countries shows a low level of variability over time; this index is also
strongly correlated with the three indicators published in La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes,
Shleifer, Vishny (1996) on corruption, rule of law, and efficiency of the judicial system. The
correlation coefficient in our sample with the CPI is 0.92 for the first, 0.82 for the second
and 0.80 for the last. This seems to testify to the robustness of the measure we used and its
capacity to capture the characteristics of a country with regard to law enforcement and the
general attitude towards illegal activities. In our analysis we use an average of the index for
                                                        
3 These indicators are undoubtedly affected by measurement errors. The indicators computed for Italy, for
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the years 1997, 1998 and 1999, and of the historical index computed by Transparency
International over the period 1988-1992 in order to capture long-lasting characteristics of the
countries.
As a proxy for the size of the public sector we use the value added share of producers
of government services from the OECD National Accounts. This measure is just a proxy for
the relative size of the public sector; it does not include market services directly produced by
the government. However, the size of the government services is likely to be correlated with
the size of the public sector at large: indeed, countries with public sector, that is well-known
to be large, like the Scandinavian ones, present a larger than average value for our indicator.
In Table 5 we report the self-employment rate in non-farm sectors, capital per worker
in purchasing power parity terms and the institutional indicators.
As shown in Table 6, self-employment has a high degree of correlation with capital per
worker, corruption index, product market regulation and, to a lesser extent, the public sector
size and labour market regulation. In this univariate analysis, the tax and social contributions
wedge does not appear to be related to self-employment.
These variables also show a substantial degree of multico-linearity. The CPI is
correlated with capital per worker. The taxation level is related, not surprisingly, to the size
of the public sector. Labour market protection is strongly correlated with product market
regulation, and they are both related to the degree of corruption and to a lesser extent to
capital per worker.
As a preliminary analysis, in Figure 3 we plot the first two principal components that
summarize the information content of the five institutional variables we consider. The first,
in the vertical axis, is strongly and positively related to labour and product market regulation,
to the degree of corruption and, to a smaller extent, to the taxation level; the second one, on
the horizontal axis, is positively correlated with the level of taxation and public sector size,
and negatively related to the corruption index (Table 7). On the vertical axis, Greece, Turkey
and Italy are opposed to Anglo-Saxon economies; the first are highly regulated and display a
high level of corruption perception, the second show a low level of market regulation and a
lower than average CPI. On the other axis, new OECD members, Mexico and Korea, are
opposed to three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) which have a high17
level of taxation, a larger than average public sector, and a low CPI. In the centre is a group
of continental European countries.
Some relation seems to emerge between the countries’ position in Figure 4 and their
self-employment rate. Countries like Italy, Greece and Turkey, placed on the upper part of
the vertical axis, and Mexico and Korea, on the extreme left of the horizontal one, have high
self-employment rates; Scandinavian countries placed on the right of the horizontal axis have
a lower than average self-employment rate.
Relying on previous considerations we could speculate that the combination of high
levels of regulation, taxation and a low level of legality, as in Turkey and Greece, or a small
public sector together with a high level of corruption and a low fiscal and social contribution
wedge, as in Mexico, Korea and to some extent Japan, are positively related to self-
employment. On the contrary, high taxation, combined with a low level of corruption and a
large public sector, are detrimental to independent work. These insights, however, need to be
further investigated, taking into account the role of capital intensity as suggested by
univariate correlation and Lucas’ theoretical analysis.
￿￿￿7KH￿ UROH￿ RI￿ LQVWLWXWLRQDO￿ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV￿ LQ￿ VHOI￿HPSOR\PHQW￿ UDWHV￿￿ DQ￿ HPSLULFDO
DVVHVVPHQW￿XVLQJ￿FURVV￿FRXQWU\￿￿FURVV￿LQGXVWU\￿GDWD
In this section we perform regressions using data on six sectors and 23 or 25 countries
depending on the set of variables included in the analysis. The sectors we consider are:
manufacturing; construction; trade, hotels and restaurants; transport and communication;
financial and business services; other services. We exclude sectors such as “energy gas and
water” and “mineral extraction” where the share of self-employment is almost nil in every
country. These country-sector panel regressions allow us to control for the industry
composition of economic activity in different countries, while expanding the degrees of
freedom.
Given that our dependent variable ranges from zero to one, a natural specification for
the functional form is the logistic function:
(1)







where \ is self-employment rate, [ is a set of regressors andε  an error term. This can be
made linear for OLS estimation by transforming the dependent variable in the following
way:














The choice of the logistic function is supported by the data. In fact, while the
regressions we performed based on the linear model usually failed the RESET test passed by
a very small margin, the logistic model always succeeded.
To better understand the structure of the data, and as a benchmark for the following
analysis, we first show the results of a regression of the self-employment rate
4 on two sets of
country and industry dummies. They explain together about 79.5 per cent of overall
variability. Industry dummies account for 32.3 per cent of self-employment variability, while
country dummies explain 46.1 per cent of it (Table 8). The relevance of our regressors can
be assessed comparing their explanatory power with that of country dummies.
As a first general assessment of the role of institutional variables, we begin by
regressing the self-employment rate at the sector level on industry dummies and the two
principal components we plotted in Figure 4, controlling for capital per worker. This
multivariate regression bears out the descriptive analysis of the previous section. Even
controlling for capital per worker, the two principal components turn out to be significantly
related to the self-employment rate. The first one, which is correlated with the regulation
levels in both the labour and the product market, and to a lesser extent to the tax and social
contribution wedge and to the corruption index, is positively related to the self-employment
rate. The second one, which is positively correlated with the wedge and the public sector size
and negatively with the CPI, is negatively related to the self-employment rate (Table 9,
column 4). From this exercise it seems that countries with high self-employment rates on
average have a combination of high levels of the tax  wedge and high levels of market
regulation and of the Corruption Perception Index. On the contrary those with a larger than
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average public sector, high taxation and social contribution wedge and low levels of
corruption have a low self-employment rate.
As to the explanatory power of our set of regressors, the addition of capital intensity
and institutional characteristics to industry dummies contributes for 32.3 percentage points to
the R-square of the regression, which is quite high compared with the 46 per cent explained
by the country dummies in the benchmark model.
To get a better understanding of the specific role of the different institutional variables,
we then regress self-employment rates on the original institutional variables, considering
first regulation and taxation separately, and then trying to assess their joint role.
The results for regulation are reported in Table 10. Product market regulation is
positively correlated with the self-employment rate (column 1). In regression (4), where we
control for capital per worker, its parameter remains significant, as when we include the
public sector size within the regressors (5), whose parameter is, as expected, negative and
significant. Similar results are obtained with labour market regulation, although this turns
out not to be significant once we introduce product market regulation in the regression
(columns 3 and 8). Taking these results at face value, it seems that public intervention in the
product market, more than employment protection, can encourage the spread of self-
employment. Our interpretation of this, is that in countries with pervasive market regulation,
independent workers, possibly politically organised, can influence public intervention so as
to mitigate competition from large business, preventing the market from reaching more
efficient equilibria. Product market regulation, however, is highly co-linear with
employment protection, and we cannot exclude that both product and labour market
regulation play a role in affecting the self-employment rate.
Turning to taxation and public sector size, in Table 11 we report the regression of self-
employment rate measured at sector level on capital per worker, public sector size and the
taxation level. Public sector size, as we have already seen, negatively affects the self-
employment rate (column 1). The tax wedge is not significantly related to the self-
employment rate (2). However, once we interact our measure with a dummy denoting those
countries with a higher than average CPI, we observe that the wedge has a negative impact
on self-employment and that its effect is inverted for countries with a high level of20
corruption (3). Once we control for the pubic sector size, only the positive impact of the
wedge for those countries with a higher than average corruption index remains significant
(6), but it is no more significant for the other countries. This could be due to the co-linearity
between public sector size and tax wedge. These results seem to support the idea that a high
tax and social contributions wedge can encourage the spread of independent work, insofar as
self-employment allows workers to evade taxes and permits firms to evade social
contributions: this is more likely to be the case in countries where illegal or irregular
activities are more tolerated.
In the end, we have jointly introduced taxation, public sector size and regulation
variables together in the regression (Table 12). The results of this exercise confirm the
previous ones. Regulation of the product market and taxation, in countries with a higher than
average Corruption Perception Index, seems to foster self-employment, whereas public
sector size and capital intensity tend to reduce it.
￿￿￿￿$Q￿H[WHQVLRQ￿XVLQJ￿FURVV￿FRXQWU\￿￿WLPH￿VHULHV￿GDWD
The available information does not allow us to check the robustness of the whole set of
results obtained in the previous section with regard to the presence of omitted country-
specific effects. However, the availability of time series on taxation and public sector size
allows us to address the problem at least for this subset of variables.
We built up a panel of country-year observations for the period 1979-2000 for the
same group of countries we analysed above, and performed the regression of self-
employment rate in the non-farm sectors on per capita GDP (as a proxy of capital intensity),
the public sector employment rate (computed using data from the OECD Economic Outlook
database), and the tax and social contribution wedge, already described in the previous
section
5, interacted with the dummy denoting those countries with a larger than average CPI.
The unemployment rate is included within the regressors as a control for the cyclical position
of the countries.
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In order to smooth short-run fluctuations, we follow Blanchard Wolfers (2000) and
Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) by arranging the data in three-year intervals, with the
exception of the first, which is a four-year time span, and taking averages over these
intervals. Consequently, we have an unbalanced panel with at most seven observations per
country.
As in the previous section we use a logistic specification, even if the linear form gives
substantially the same results, and we introduce country-effects and country-specific time
trends within the regressors to control for fixed and time-varying country-specific
unobserved factors.
Therefore our model reads:
(3)  LW L L L LW LW 7 [ \ ε λ µ γ β + + + + =
where [￿is a matrix of covariates, 7 is a time trend,   is a time-invariant, country-
specific effect,   is a time effect common across countries.
In Table 13 we present our regression results for both the levels and the first difference
of the model. By differencing we get rid of time-invariant country-specific effects, while
fixed effects control for the country-specific time trend. In the model in levels, both country-
specific fixed effects and time trend are explicitly introduced within the regressors. In both
cases we used OLS and a generalised least square estimator, correcting for heteroskedasticity
and country-specific first- order autocorrelation
6. Comparing the results obtained with the
two estimators, parameter estimates for public sector size and tax wedge differ in size and
show different standard errors, but they do not contradict each other.
The results of these exercises appear substantially coherent with those obtained in
cross-section regressions presented in the previous section. The public sector size negatively
affects the self-employment rate, and the tax and social contribution wedge affects countries
with a higher than average Corruption Perception Index in a different way from those with a
lower than average level of this indicator. This result seems even sharper than that obtained
in cross-section regressions, given that, even controlling for the public sector size, the wedge
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seems to foster self-employment in countries where the CPI is relatively high and to hinder
its spread in those where the CPI is relatively low.
These results have proved to be robust to changes in sample composition; in fact, they
did not change when performing regressions by dropping one country at a time from the
sample. Moreover, a dynamic specification gives substantially the same results (Table 14).
￿￿￿￿&RQFOXVLRQV
Self-employment rates differ in a substantial and persistent way across countries. We
have shown that industrial composition plays a minor role in explaining such large
disparities and we have argued that institutional variables, together with still strong
differences in capital endowment even among OECD countries, are the most likely factors
behind differences in self-employment rates. We have singled out five institutional variables:
public sector size, labour and product market regulation indicators, tax and social
contribution wedge and the Corruption Perception Index, the last as a proxy for the degree of
legality of a country. Univariate analysis shows that the self-employment rate is correlated
with the public sector size, labour and product market regulation, and the Corruption
Perception Index.
The regression of the self-employment rate on capital intensity and the two principal
components extracted from these variables shows that countries with tight regulation, heavy
taxation and a high corruption index have higher than average self-employment rates,
whereas those with large public sectors, high taxation and a low CPI show a lower incidence
of self-employment.
Regressions performed using single institutional variables as regressors seem to
confirm these results: larger public sectors reduce self-employment rates, whereas high
levels of the tax and social contribution wedge foster its spread in countries where the
corruption index is higher. As to market regulation, we find that the indicator for the product
market is positively related to the self-employment rate.
Regressions performed on cross-country, time-series data, which allow us to control
for country-specific effects, show that the impact of public sector size and taxation obtained23
in cross-country regression does not depend on missing country effects. These results seem
to confirm the difference in the impact of the tax and social contribution wedge according to
the level of legality of a country, as its parameter turns out to be positive in countries with a
higher than average Corruption Perception Index and negative in the others.
Our interpretation of these results is that product market regulation can be used by
public authorities to protect fragmented, possibly inefficient market equilibria, and that in
countries with a comparatively low levels of legality, self-employment can be fostered by the
fact that it offers more chance to avoid tax and social contribution payments. On the
contrary, economies with a large public sector offer less scope for entrepreneurial activities
and self-employment in general. Moreover, high levels of taxation can discourage
entrepreneurial activities if taxation rules are fully enforced regardless of the employment
status, as is likely to be the case in countries with a lower than average CPI.
The case of Italy offers an interesting example of how these institutional characteristics
can, in practice, affect the employment structure. Italy’s self-employment rate stands out
among the industrialised countries and is a well-known characteristic of the Italian economy
(Sestito, 1989). In the last 30 years, in spite of the renewed upturn in self-employment in
many industrialised countries, its ranking has remained almost unchanged, as the self-
employment rate has risen slightly in Italy too since the mid 1970s.
Italy has both a high tax and social contribution wedge and a high CPI; these
characteristics should induce high levels of tax evasion and according to previous analysis
should foster self-employment. This is consistent with research on tax evasion in Italy
(Bernardi Bernasconi (1996), Cannari, Ceriani D’Alessio (1995), Alesina Marè (1996),
according to which it is not only comparatively large but also a particularly common
phenomenon among independent workers and small businesses. Moreover, in recent years,
special contractual arrangements, such as the so called “continuous and coordinated
contractual relationships”, have fostered bogus self-employment in Italy. These contracts are
sometimes used to hire economically dependent workers as independent ones, so as to
benefit from the reduction in social contribution payments this entails and to bypass
employment protection legislation and national contract provisions (Altieri Carrieri, 2000).
This kind of phenomenon is not confined to Italy, but it seems more common here than in
other countries (OECD (2000), EiroObserver (2002)).24
Italy also offers clear examples of how product market regulation can create
favourable conditions for the spread of self-employment. The retail trade sector, which by
itself accounts for a large part of the anomalous situation in Italy, is the most important
example of this. Under previous regulations, municipalities and local committees, composed
of the mayor, shop-keepers’ representatives and other institutions, were in charge of drawing
up the so-called “retail trade plans”, which explicitly stated the number of shops and stores
that could be established in each area. This system represented a substantial barrier to the
spread of chain stores, by granting to incumbent shop-keepers’ representatives the power to
prevent large companies from entering local markets, and causing a fragmentation of the
market structure (Pellegrini (1994), Pellegrini (1996), Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza
(1993)). In turn, this seems to explain why, in spite of recent reforms, independent workers
in this sector still account for about 58 per cent of total employment, as opposed to an
average of 26 per cent at European level.
We believe that factors of this kind, which our analysis has shown to be significantly
associated with the spread of self-employment across OECD countries, have contributed in a
substantial way to determining the large self-employment rate in Italy and to supporting the
well-known entrepreneurial spirit of the Italian people.7DEOHV￿DQG￿ILJXUHV
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Sources: Eurostat and OECD.27
Table 2
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Industry EU-15 B DNK DEU GRC ESP FRA IRL
Agriculture (A-B) 67.7 79.1 57.6 47.9 95.9 62.7 69.9 81.5
Mining and quarrying (C) 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.6 3.5 2.1 0.0
Manufacturing (D) 8.5 6.1 4.6 5.2 29.1 12.9 5.8 7.3
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.0
Construction (F) 23.8 25.6 15.6 11.9 36.5 22.5 22.2 27.0
Wholesale and retail, repairs (G) 25.5 34.9 13.9 14.5 56.1 37.7 17.8 20.4
Hotels and restaurants (H) 27.4 44.0 16.2 24.8 48.2 35.8 26.7 18.4
Transport, communication (I) 11.6 6.3 10.1 7.6 28.6 25.9 5.1 19.5
Financial intermediation (J) 7.3 12.9 1.2 10.3 5.2 6.7 4.5 5.5
Real estate, business act. (K) 22.8 28.2 16.1 22.4 55.2 24.4 12.8 22.2
Public administration (L) 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Other services (M-Q) 10.1 12.4 4.0 10.1 15.5 9.8 8.0 9.9
Non-farm sectors 14.2 16.0 7.9 9.9 32.1 19.7 9.8 14.1
Total 16.7 17.4 9.7 11.0 43.4 23.1 12.5 20.2
Industry ITA LUX NLD AUT PRT FIN SWE GBR
Agriculture (A-B) 62.3 80.0 56.9 86.4 83.5 75.5 70.8 53.3
Mining and quarrying (C) 11.4 0.0 0.0 9.1 5.9 20.0 0.0 4.0
Manufacturing (D) 17.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 13.9 6.2 5.5 5.4
Electricity, gas, water supply (E) 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 3.9
Construction (F) 39.2 0.0 15.5 7.1 26.7 26.5 23.0 35.1
Wholesale and retail, repairs (G) 57.4 13.6 13.2 12.1 41.8 16.4 20.4 12.5
Hotels and restaurants (H) 45.2 25.0 16.3 24.2 35.7 11.7 18.1 13.0
Transport, communication (I) 18.0 8.3 5.2 5.6 14.6 12.2 10.0 11.9
Financial intermediation (J) 13.9 0.0 3.8 3.5 6.9 4.2 2.3 4.1
Real estate, business act. (K) 47.8 16.7 14.7 18.4 26.9 16.8 17.3 20.0
Public administration (L) 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
Other services (M-Q) 16.1 7.7 8.6 8.5 10.6 5.9 4.4 10.2
Non-farm sectors 26.6 7.8 10.1 8.8 20.1 9.9 9.6 12.0













EU-15 14.2 14.2 0.0
EUR-11 14.5 14.7 -0.1
AUT 8.8 8.5 0.3
BEL 16.0 16.7 -0.7
DEU 9.9 10.4 -0.5
DNK 7.9 8.0 -0.1
ESP 19.7 18.1 1.7
FIN 9.9 10.2 -0.3
FRA 9.8 10.3 -0.5
GBR 12.0 11.7 0.3
GRC 32.1 30.1 2.0
IRL 14.1 13.2 0.9
ITA 26.6 27.1 -0.4
LUX 7.8 7.8 0.0
NLD 10.1 8.8 1.3
PRT 20.1 19.1 1.0
SWE 9.6 10.1 -0.5
Sources: Eurostat, own calculations.
1 Theoretical values are computed assuming the European average












where L, is the sector, M the country, H is the European average, 6 is the




Country 1970 1978 1990 1998 2000
AUS 9.6 12.3 13.0 12.4 12.3
AUT 12.7 9.4 7.9 8.7 8.7
BEL 15.2 14.3 16.4 16.9 16.9
CAN 7 7.2 7.4 10.2 9.5
DEU 10.3 8.3 8.5 9.9 9.6
DNK 13.4 11.4 8.6 7.7 7.2
FIN 6.7 6.9 9.5 10.2 10.0
FRA 12.5 10.7 9.3 8.2 7.9
GBR 6.7 6.8 14.2 12.5 11.7
GRC - 31.9 32.4 32.1 30.4
ICE 10.3 8.5 11.3 14.9 15.0
IRL 10.8 11.0 13.8 14.2 13.7
ITA 24.5 22.7 25.8 27 26.7
JPN 22.6 21.4 17.3 13.7 13.2
KOR - 34.5 27.9 31.3 31
LUX 12.3 9.8 7.1 5.7 5.6
MEX - - 33.1 31.5 30.3
NLD - 8.7 9.1 10.4 9.9
NOR 8.6 8.0 7.0 5.6 5.1
NZL - 9.4 15.5 17 17.4
PRT 13.1 15.5 18.2 20.1 18.7
SPA 21.2 19.8 21 20 17.8
SWE 6.2 4.5 7.8 9.1 9.0



























AUS 12.7 21949 38729 3.8 1.3 19.7 0.9 1.1
AUT 8.9 23077 36641 13.6 2.4 38.9 1.4 2.4
BEL 15.6 23242 39416 12.4 4.7 48.7 1.9 2.1
CAN 9.9 23761 44970 10.4 0.8 27.9 1.5 0.6
DEU 9.9 22049 41115 11.6 2.0 44.0 1.4 2.8
DNK 7.7 25514 33814 19.7 0.0 38.2 1.4 1.5
FIN 9.9 20488 47498 17.9 0.4 44.9 1.7 2.1
FRA 9.5 21293 37460 17.1 3.4 44.1 2.1 3.1
GBR 11.6 20483 22509 11.6 1.5 28.4 0.5 0.5
GRC 31.5 13912 23738 9.4 5.0 36.0 2.2 3.5
IRL 13.9 20634 22171 14.5 1.9 28.9 0.8 1.0
ICE 14.9 24836 26488 13.6 0.6 10.8 - -
ITA 26.4 21265 33775 12.8 5.2 47.4 2.3 3.3
JPN 13.5 24574 41286 7.7 3.9 18.2 1.5 2.6
KOR 31.2 14477 17995 8.0 5.9 12.0 2.4 2.3
LUX 7.7 33119 55377 10.7 1.3 24.1 - -
MEX 30.8 7697 13697 5.5 6.9 25.3 1.9 2.0
NLD 10.1 22142 34084 10.2 1.0 38.3 1.3 2.4
NOR 5.1 26771 47118 16.2 1.1 31.2 2.2 2.9
NZL 17.2 17846 35359 10.8 0.7 18.9 1.3 1.0
PRT 19.3 14562 13493 15.4 3.3 30.4 1.7 3.7
SPA 18.7 15990 30888 13.4 3.8 36.4 1.6 3.2
SWE 9.5 20439 41017 20.6 0.6 48.0 1.4 3.2
TUR 27.7 6463 7626 10.3 6.6 42.0 2.9 3.6













































































Product market regulation 0.59 -0.15




Dependent variable:  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* , where \ is the
self-employment rate
Industry dummies Country dummies Industry and
country
dummies




Dependent variable:  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* , where \
is the self-employment rate
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R2 0.581 0.593 0.600 0.646
RESET test (P-value) 0.868 0.956 0.996 0.844
Number of observations 136 136 136 136
P-values in brackets (robust standard errors).




  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* , where \ is the
self-employment rate
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R2 0.430 0.375 0.430 0.606 0.646 0.576 0.630 0.648
RESET test (P-value) 0.443 0.568 0.456 0.999 0.992 0.974 0.979 0.997
Number of observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
P-values in brackets (robust standard errors).




Dependent variable: () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* ,
where \ is the self-employment rate
12345





























R2 0.611 0.584 0.645 0.623 0.661
RESET Test P-value 0.988 0.964 0.800 0.804 0.793
Number of observations 148 148 148 148 148
(1) CPI is a dummy denoting countries with a higher than average CPI.
P-values in brackets (robust standard errors).




Dependent variable:  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* , where \ is the self-
employment rate
12 3

































R2 0.652 0.663 0.663
RESET test P-value 0.992 0.876 0.875
Number of observations 136 136 136
(1) CPI is a dummy denoting those country with a CPI index higher than the average.
P-values in parenthesis (Robust standard errors).




(levels and first differences model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* ,
where \ is the self-employment





















































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country specific time trend Yes Yes No No
Number of observations 160 160 134 134
CPI is a dummy denoting countries with a higher than average CPI.







Dependent variable:  () () \ \ \ − = 1 / ln
* , where \ is the self-
employment rate in the non-farm sectors
OLS GLS
(2)

























Country dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes
Number of observations 134 133
CPI is a dummy denoting those countries with a higher than average CPI.
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